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A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
T. Jeremy Gunn∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, the U.S. Congress expressed its growing concern about 
violations of religious freedom abroad by enacting the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (“IRFA”).1 IRFA directs the U.S. 
government generally—and the U.S. Department of State in particu-
lar—to play a more active role in promoting freedom of religion 
abroad. Although little has been published about IRFA, some schol-
ars, human rights activists, and foreign observers view IRFA with 
suspicion.2 
There are significant misunderstandings about IRFA, both by its 
supporters within the United States and by its critics in the United 
 
∗ Attorney, Washington, D.C. The author was a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of 
Peace in 1998-99, during which he worked at the Office of International Religious Freedom at 
the U.S. Department of State. He is now Senior Fellow for Religion and Human Rights at 
Emory University.  The views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Institute of Peace. The author 
wishes to thank Marc Porter and John Smith for their assistance in preparation of this article. 
 1. See 22 U.S.C. h 6401 (1998), amended by Pub. L. No. 106-55, 113 Stat. 401 
(1999). For the Public Law version of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
(“IRFA”), see Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998). For a brief discussion of the his-
tory leading to the adoption of IRFA, see infra Part II. 
 2. The author heard the criticisms by foreign government officials while at the De-
partment of State as well as criticisms by scholars and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
in conferences, colloquia, and seminars. Unfortunately, there have been few published articles 
that articulate the criticisms that are commonly shared by informed people outside the United 
States and by some scholars and NGO activists within the United States. One of the first ef-
forts to address IRFA systematically came at a conference entitled “Religious Persecution as a 
U.S. Policy Issue,” sponsored by the Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life at Trinity 
College in Hartford, Connecticut, on September 26-27, 1999. See RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION 
AS A U.S. POLICY ISSUE: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONSULTATION HELD AT TRINITY COLLEGE, 
HARTFORD (Rosalind I.J. Hackett et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter HARTFORD CONFERENCE]. 
The participants at the Hartford Conference identified most of the criticisms that have been 
levied against IRFA. See discussion infra Part III; see also Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Exporting 
Religion: Where the Religious Freedom Act Fails, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 26, 1999, at 10. Profes-
sor Sullivan and the author were among the participants at the Hartford Conference. 
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States and abroad. Its supporters are often unaware of the negative 
response that IRFA has provoked from abroad. To many of its crit-
ics, the law appears to be an attempt by the United States to employ 
the blunt tool of sanctions to promote unilaterally a peculiarly 
American agenda. But the critics of IRFA often have an inaccurate 
understanding of the genesis of the law and how the law actually is 
implemented by the U.S. government. This Article provides a pre-
liminary discussion of some of the important criticisms that have 
been levied against IRFA and urges that there be a more informed 
discussion of the issues by both supporters and critics of the law. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998 
By 1996, the issue of religious discrimination and persecution 
abroad captured the attention of several members of Congress and 
their staffs. Early that year, the International Operations and Human 
Rights Subcommittee of the House of Representatives held hearings 
on the worldwide persecution of Christians3 and Jews.4 Following 
the hearings, Congress adopted resolutions on the persecution of 
Christians5 and on the persecution of Baha’is in Iran.6 Later that 
year, in conjunction with the passage of the Omnibus Consolidated 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997, the Managers’ Statement 
requested that the Department of State report to the Congress on 
the persecution of Christians throughout the world.7 As interest in 
the issue of persecution and religious freedom continued to mount, 
some members of Congress came to believe that the United States 
was not doing enough to respond to the abuses of religious freedom 
and that Congress should enact a law requiring the U.S. government 
and the U.S. Department of State to become more fully engaged in 
the issue. 
 
 3. See Persecution of Christians Worldwide: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Opera-
tions and Human Rights of the Comm. on Int’l Relations of the House Subcomm. on Int’l Rela-
tions, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 4. See Worldwide Persecution of Jews: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations 
and Human Rights of the House Comm. on Int’l Relations, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 5. See S. Con. Res. 71, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 6. See H.R. Con. Res. 102, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 7. The report was released, in photocopy format, on July 22, 1997, as UNITED STATES 
POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FOCUS ON CHRISTIANS (Report Consistent 
with the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 3610). 
See also U.S. Department of State Web Site (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/ 
www/global/human_rights/970722_relig_rpt_christian.html>. 
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On May 20, 1997, Republican Congressman Frank Wolf of Vir-
ginia introduced H.R. 1685, a bill to “establish an Office of Reli-
gious Persecution Monitoring, to provide for the imposition of sanc-
tions against countries engaged in a pattern of religious persecution, 
and for other purposes.”8 This bill, the first version of what was to 
become IRFA, was popularly known as the “Wolf-Specter” bill. It 
prompted an intense debate within the U.S. government, religious 
groups, and the business community.9 The most controversial provi-
sion of the Wolf-Specter bill was its requirement that the U.S. gov-
ernment automatically impose sanctions on countries found to be 
violators of international religious freedom, a provision that the Clin-
ton Administration strongly opposed. After holding hearings in late 
1997, the House International Relations Committee worked for six 
months to revise the original Wolf-Specter bill and introduced an 
amended version as H.R. 2431 in 1998.10 H.R. 2431, as amended, 
passed the House on May 14, 1998, as the “Freedom From Reli-
gious Persecution Act of 1998” and was sent to the Senate. In a sur-
prise move, shortly before the Senate was scheduled to vote on the 
House version, Senator Nickles introduced a significantly revised ver-
sion of the bill, which the Senate adopted unanimously on October 
9, 1998, under the title “International Religious Freedom Act of 
1998.” By voice vote, the House unanimously approved the Senate 
version the following day. President Clinton signed IRFA into law 
on October 27, 1998. 
IRFA created three new entities within the U.S. government to 
promote international religious freedom: the Office on International 
Religious Freedom within the Department of State, headed by an 
Ambassador-at-Large; an independent nine-member Commission on 
International Religious Freedom (with the Ambassador-at-Large 
serving as an additional ex officio member); and a special adviser on 
international religious freedom at the National Security Council.11 
 
 8. H.R. 1685, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 772, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 9. See, e.g., the testimony of the Honorable John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, before the House International Relations Commit-
tee, Sept. 9, 1997, U.S. Department of State Web Site (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http:// 
www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/970722.shattuck.html>. See also Jeffrey Goldberg, 
Washington Discovers Christian Persecution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 21, 1997, at 46. 
 10. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 1, at 15 (1998). 
 11. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6411, 6431 (1998); 50 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1998). The Office of 
International Religious Freedom has been placed organizationally within the Department of 
State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and is designated “DRL/IRF” within 
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The law imposes a number of responsibilities on the Office of Inter-
national Religious Freedom, including issuing an annual report on 
the status of religious freedom on each foreign country, advising the 
President and Secretary of State on religious freedom abroad, and 
representing the United States with foreign governments on issues of 
religious freedom.12 The report, to be issued in September of each 
year, also must identify those countries of the world that “violate” 
religious freedom, especially those that commit “particularly severe 
violations of religious freedom.”13 
III. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES 
I am made very uncomfortable in countries around the world when 
I get complaints from well-meaning citizens about the U.S.’s moral 
meddling in their affairs. And I get these complaints even from 
people who[m] you would think would gain from the U.S.’s role as 
a kind of policeman and vigilant monitor of rights. It makes me 
uneasy, especially when they call to mind instances such as Waco or 
our policies towards Native Americans, our racial tensions and so 
on. 
 —Professor Jay Demerath at the Hartford Conference14 
 
Possibly the most frequently heard complaint from abroad re-
garding IRFA is that the United States has, once again, taken upon 
itself the role of “moral watchdog” or “moral policeman” for the 
world. To foreign observers, it may well appear that the United 
States, which already issues an annual Country Reports on Human 
Rights, is now intervening one step further by criticizing states on 
what may well be regarded as the most difficult and sensitive human 
 
the Department of State. The Ambassador-at-Large also serves as an ex officio member of the 
Commission on International Religious Freedom. See 22 U.S.C. § 6431(b)(1)(A). President 
Clinton appointed the Honorable Robert A. Seiple to be the first Ambassador-at-Large for 
International Religious Freedom shortly after IRFA was signed into law. Ambassador Seiple 
resigned effective September 2000. 
 12. See 22 U.S.C. § 6411(c). 
 13. Id. § 102(b)(1)(A). See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT: 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1999, REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Joint 
Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter 1999 RELIGION REPORT]. The first report was issued on Sep-
tember 9, 1999. The second report was issued on September 5, 2000. 
 14. HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 20. 
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rights issue: the freedom of religion and belief. As a vastly more 
complex issue than freedom from torture or freedom of expression, 
the freedom of religion and belief is necessarily intertwined with each 
country’s particular identity, traditions, culture, and nationhood. 
The discussion below identifies six of the recurring and interre-
lated criticisms leveled at IRFA and replies briefly to each. Although 
these criticisms are not exhaustive, they include those most fre-
quently raised. 
A. Criticism 1: IRFA Promotes an American Model of Separation of 
Church and State that Does Not Conform to the Histories, Traditions, 
and Cultures of Other Societies 
[IRFA] is premised on an American understanding of religious 
freedom and practice, including notions of “disestablishment” or 
separation of church and state. This is problematic as a basis for the 
protection of freedom of religion at a global level because of fun-
damental differences about what “freedom of religion” means. 
 —Professor Abdullahi An-Na’im at the Hartford Conference15 
 
Professor An-Na’im correctly identifies perhaps the most impor-
tant criticism that is offered against IRFA from outside the United 
States: that it promotes an American model of separation of church 
and state that is anathema to other societies and cultures. Such a 
criticism can be directed both at the way IRFA presents itself as well 
as at the underlying American failure to understand traditions and 
cultures that differ from its own. 
IRFA’s own rhetoric gives credence to the criticism that it is 
based narrowly on the American historical experience: 
The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and ex-
istence of the United States. Many of our Nation’s founders fled 
religious persecution abroad, cherishing in their hearts and minds 
the ideal of religious freedom. They established in law, as a funda-
mental right and as a pillar of our Nation, the right to freedom of 
religion. From its birth to this day, the United States has prized 
this legacy of religious freedom and honored this heritage by  
 
 
 
 15. HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 22. 
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standing for religious freedom and offering refuge to those suffer-
ing religious persecution.16 
This description of the American founders as having established free-
dom of religion as a pillar of the nation is seriously misleading, if not 
incorrect.17 It triumphantly conveys an idealized self-image that 
would be unrecognizable to many religious minorities, including 
Catholics, Jews, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Quakers, Hindus, 
and Buddhists, who originally suffered from discrimination or vio-
lence in the United States. While it is true that some religious believ-
ers originally came to America to escape persecution, it is also true 
that many of them, upon arriving, promptly launched their own 
forms of religious persecution and intolerance against others. The re-
ligious freedom that exists in the United States today came not as a 
cherished legacy ceremoniously handed down from the founding fa-
thers, as IRFA suggests, but emerged only after many painful politi-
cal and legal struggles by minority religions against societal intoler-
ance. Unfortunately, IRFA’s idealized history can send a message to 
foreign observers that is counterproductive to IRFA’s important 
goals, for it may wrongly imply that the United States has long been 
the beacon of full religious liberty and that other countries should 
attempt to emulate an American model. 
While inserting such an idealized history in IRFA was rhetorically 
counterproductive, at least from the perspective of dispassionate for-
eign observers, it is nevertheless important to note that the Depart-
ment of State itself does not convey such a message either in its pub-
lic reporting or in its diplomatic negotiations. The Department of 
State identifies the official U.S. position as follows: 
Grounded in and informed by the American experience, in which 
religious liberty is “the first freedom” of the Constitution, the law 
nevertheless does not attempt to impose “the American way” on 
other nations. Rather, it draws on the internationally accepted be-
lief in the inviolable dignity of the human person and of the univer-
sal rights that flow from that belief. These rights are reflected in in-
ternational covenants, which are, in turn, cited in the Act as key  
 
 
 
 16. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(1). 
 17. Professor Sullivan correctly criticized IRFA for providing an inaccurate and idealized 
version of American history. See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 11. 
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standards on religious freedom by which governments—including 
that of the United States—must be judged.18 
The Department of State correctly identifies religious liberty not as 
the oldest of American rights but as the first to have been enumer-
ated in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. 
More importantly, the Department of State refers to the interna-
tional human rights instruments that IRFA itself identifies as the 
guiding norms by which the United States also should be judged. 
The legislative findings of IRFA itself include the recognition that: 
(2) Freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human 
right and fundamental freedom articulated in numerous interna-
tional instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Helsinki Accords, the Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Be-
lief, the United Nations Charter, and the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
(3) Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights rec-
ognizes that “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion. This right includes freedom to change his re-
ligion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship, and observance.” Article 18(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes 
that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either indi-
vidually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and 
teaching.” Governments have the responsibility to protect the fun-
damental rights of their citizens and to pursue justice for all. Reli-
gious freedom is a fundamental right of every individual, regardless 
of race, sex, country, creed, or nationality, and should never be ar-
bitrarily abridged by any government.19 
Thus, the Department of State and IRFA (setting aside some of its 
rhetoric) acknowledge that both the United States and other coun-
tries should be held to the standards adopted by the international 
 
 18. 1999 RELIGION REPORT, supra note 13, at 2 (Introduction). 
 19. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(2)-(3). 
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community and not by an American model of church-state separa-
tion. The United States, officially, does not apply American stan-
dards on freedom of religion to others nor does it excuse itself from 
complying with international norms.20 
Professor An-Na’im’s important criticism cannot be answered 
fully, however, simply by pointing to the official positions and inten-
tions of the U.S. government. Americans, like all people, are capable 
of conflating their own parochial beliefs with idealized international 
norms. Whereas Americans might argue that they are promoting in-
ternational standards, they might, in fact, simply be promoting their 
own system. It is reasonable to suspect that Americans’ interpreta-
tion of international instruments will be influenced by the American 
historical experience, just as it would be reasonable to suspect that 
others also will interpret the meaning of international instruments 
through their own historical and cultural experiences. 
Although each country has its own unique history and traditions, 
it is possible to identify two general types for the purpose of illustrat-
ing how a misunderstanding can develop between Americans and 
others regarding the meaning of religious freedom. 
In most countries of the world, a dominant religious tradition 
played a disproportionately influential role in shaping the modern 
histories of those countries as well as helped form their cultures, tra-
ditions, and institutions. Catholicism played such a role in, for exam-
ple, Latin America, Spain, Italy, Austria, and Poland. Lutheranism 
was such a religion in (northern) Germany, Scandinavia, and Estonia. 
Christian Orthodoxy is dominant not only in Russia, but throughout 
eastern and south-eastern Europe. Islam, in its many forms, is the 
dominant religious influence in the Maghreb, the Levant, the Middle 
East, Central Asia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In such coun-
tries, the dominant religious tradition is not a mere cultural gloss, 
but has been deeply influential in shaping national and personal 
identity. As a part of the popular culture, it will be assumed that “to 
be Polish is to be Catholic,” “to be Greek is to be Orthodox,” and 
“to be a Saudi is to be a Wahhabi Muslim.” In such countries, relig-
ion is not a matter of individual choice, but is an integral part of per-
sonal identity and is almost akin to one’s race, native language, and 
 
 20. The author is aware of no instance where the Department of State has suggested to 
a foreign government that it should implement a U.S. model; rather, the benchmark is always 
presented as the language of the international instruments. 
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family. In such countries, governmental and political support to the 
traditional religion is not seen as a violation of religious freedom but 
as a means to support religion and religious freedom of the vast ma-
jority of citizens. 
Moreover, it is quite common in many countries (including sev-
eral in Europe) for the law to limit the number of religious groups 
that are able to receive a range of legal benefits. Consequently, a 
two-tiered system that provides different rights for religious groups 
depending on the type of legal recognition they receive is quite 
common.21 Thus, a few of the larger or more traditional religions 
commonly receive state benefits, including tax-exempt status, legal 
personality, state-financed religious education, and state-supported 
religious schools. These benefits are denied to other religious 
groups, even though members of those groups also are taxpayers and 
citizens. Governments frequently defend such practices as “protect-
ing” citizens from foreign or unknown religions. 
In the United States, on the other hand, religious affiliation is 
now generally understood to be a matter of personal choice. Al-
though children may be born and raised in a particular religious tra-
dition, as adults they will be free to convert to other faiths. While 
popular prejudices against some religions surely inhibit the range of 
personal choices, the dominant presumption in the United States is 
that religious affiliation is a matter to be decided by the individual 
and that such decisions should not undercut civil standing or politi-
cal rights. This indulgence for personal choice in turn spawns a wide 
variety of religious groups from which the individual may choose. Al-
though the United States continues to be predominantly Christian 
and Protestant, the range of choices both within and outside of 
Christianity is quite high. Similarly, Americans generally believe that 
governments should not provide financial support to specific relig-
ions and certainly should not select a particular religious doctrine as 
an established or state religion. These two types of system (“tradi-
tional” versus “individual choice”), though overly simplified here, 
illustrate a fundamental difference in how religious freedom is com-
monly understood outside and inside the United States. 
 
 21. For the most important publication describing this issue, see W. COLE DURHAM, 
JR., FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: LAWS AFFECTING THE STRUCTURING OF RELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITIES (1999). The publication was prepared for and issued by the Office of Democ-
ratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe in Warsaw, Poland. 
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The Department of State recognizes, in principle, that different 
countries have varying approaches to the role of religion in society 
that arise from their different traditions. 
Occasionally a nation’s policy on religious freedom can be better 
understood in the context of its history, culture, and tradition—a 
particular religion may have dominated the life of a nation for cen-
turies, making more difficult the acceptance of new faiths that offer 
challenges in both cultural and theological terms. But tradition and 
culture should not be used as a pretext for legislation or policies 
that restrict genuine religious belief or its legitimate manifesta-
tions.22 
While formally recognizing the cultural and historical differences, the 
United States nevertheless argues, correctly, that differences of reli-
gious and cultural traditions do not exempt states from complying 
with international standards. Indeed, international human rights law 
is created for the purpose of bringing an end to historical and tradi-
tional practices that infringe on the rights that are identified in the 
international instruments. In fact, it is probably accurate to say that 
the classic argument used by those who oppose human rights is that 
they undermine traditional practices. Whether it was racial segrega-
tion in the American South, apartheid in South Africa, or the denial 
of the right of women to vote in Switzerland, the defenders of those 
practices complained that the innovations were inconsistent with the 
history, traditions, and cultures of those societies. The point of hu-
man rights, however, is to end the historical, traditional, and cultural 
practices that discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and religion.23 
 
 22. 1999 RELIGION REPORT, supra note 13, at 4. 
 23. Some examples of nondiscrimination provisions within international conventions 
include: 
[Purposes of the United Nations are accomplished in achieving] international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or hu-
manitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or relig-
ion.  
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (emphasis added). 
[The General Assembly shall make recommendations for the purpose of] promoting 
international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health 
fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . . 
Id. at art. 13, para. 1(b) (emphasis added). 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
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 There are ample grounds for discussion and disagreement about 
the scope and meaning of the international standards regarding free-
dom of religion and belief. Americans and their foreign interlocutors 
would do well to engage in a serious discussion about how the 
United States and the world community can better understand the 
proper scope of the freedom of religion and belief and to end dis-
crimination on the basis of religion and belief. The United States 
would do well to understand how different traditions have shaped 
viewpoints about the meaning of religious freedom. It also would be 
appropriate for foreign observers to examine how their traditions of 
dominant religions and state-approved religions can lead to discrimi-
nation against newer and minority religions whose rights are fully 
protected under ratified international human rights instruments. 
B. Criticism 2: IRFA Reflects the Political Interests of the Christian 
Right in the United States and Promotes Missionary Religions 
I think the legislative history of this Act will probably reflect there 
was a great deal of interest in protecting the rights of Christians 
and so forth when the bill was conceived and also when people re-
sponded, constituents and so forth. So I think that the burden is 
probably on the U.S. government to show that in this Act they’re 
not engaging in crusading or proselytization [sic] on behalf of the 
Christian religion. . . . I see here that [the proponents of IRFA] are 
trying to be sensitive to that, and trying not to create that  
 
 
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 
2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (emphasis added). 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimina-
tion and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination 
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Id. at art. 26 (emphasis added). 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be se-
cured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, relig-
ion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status. 
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, 312 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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impression. But I think it’s certainly an uphill battle in terms of 
world opinion. 
 —Ms. Jemera Rone at the Hartford Conference24 
 
Jemera Rone, an African specialist at Human Rights Watch, 
identifies here two interrelated and widely shared foreign criticisms 
of IRFA: that the Christian right successfully pressured Congress 
into adopting legislation favoring Christianity and that it is designed, 
in part, to promote American missionary activities abroad. Some for-
eign officials have even suggested in private exchanges that they 
sympathize with American diplomats who must include religious 
freedom in negotiations in order to appease politically powerful do-
mestic groups. 
There are a number of understandable reasons why observers 
might reach such conclusions. As was discussed above, some of the 
actions by Congress in 1996 and 1997 focused conspicuously on 
Christian concerns.25 The emergence of this Congressional interest 
was associated with some highly publicized contemporaneous allega-
tions that Christians are the “most persecuted” people in the 
world.26 It is frequently reported and widely believed, albeit inaccu-
rately, that the early drafts of IRFA focused exclusively on protecting 
Christians from persecution.27 It is true that the draft legislation was 
endorsed and promoted, at different points, by some influential 
groups associated with the religious right, including the National As-
sociation of Evangelicals, the Southern Baptist Ethics and Religious  
 
 
 24. HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 56. 
 25. See supra notes 3, 7 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 48; see also PAUL MARSHALL, THEIR BLOOD CRIES 
OUT: THE WORLDWIDE TRAGEDY OF MODERN CHRISTIANS WHO ARE DYING FOR THEIR 
FAITH (1997); NINA SHEA, IN THE LIONS DEN: PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND WHAT THE 
WESTERN CHURCH CAN DO ABOUT IT (1997); Linda Lawson, Christians Labeled “Most Perse-
cuted”, BAPTIST PRESS, Dec. 26, 1996 (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.umr.org 
/Htpersec.htm>. 
 27. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 2, at 10 (“The act, and its predecessor versions, some 
of which targeted only the persecution of Christians . . . .”). The Wolf-Specter bill, H.R. 1685, 
105th Cong. h 2(3) (1997), cited “[p]ersecution of religious believers, particularly Roman 
Catholic and evangelical Protestant Christians [by] Communist countries.” But the Wolf-
Specter bill did not pertain solely to persecuted Christians. It also referred to the “persecution 
of Baha’is, Christians, and other religious minorities” in Iran, id. § 2(4), to Tibetan Buddhists, 
id. § 2(6), and to Sudan’s “religious war against Christian, non-Muslim, and moderate Muslim 
persons,” id. § 2(5). 
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Liberty Committee, the Christian Coalition, the Family Research 
Council, Evangelicals for Social Action, and the Prison Fellowship.28 
While it is fair to say that many influential groups affiliated with 
the Christian right campaigned for the law that ultimately became 
IRFA, their influence should not be overestimated or interpreted 
without nuance. One of the legislative staffers who worked on the 
legislation responded to this perception as follows: 
It has seemed from several comments that some of you carry the 
suspicion that this Act was the work of the religious right. While it 
is undoubtedly true that there are many in the religious right who 
care deeply about this issue, this suspicion of their involvement 
with this bill is one which those of us who worked on the Act 
would view with a certain degree of irony, because we had such 
mixed experience and even some frustrations at times with the reli-
gious right. I do not want to get into naming names, but in one in-
stance, for example, when Laura Bryant raised a couple of substan-
tive questions about the Wolf-Specter bill, she was told by one 
leader that it was because of people like her that the Nazis suc-
ceeded in sending millions to the death camps, and she was stand-
ing in the way of large numbers of religious believers being saved 
from a similar fate.29 
The text of IRFA uses the word “Christians” only twice, and then 
only by way of reference to the resolutions that were adopted by the 
previous Congress.30 The words “Catholic,” “Protestant,” and 
“Evangelical,” do not appear in the text. (Nor do the words “Mus-
lim,” “Islam,” “Buddhist,” or “Hindu” for that matter.) The lan-
guage of IRFA does not highlight persecution of any particular 
group but refers instead to the touchstone “international” and “uni-
versal” standards that are identified as the guiding norms for IRFA. 
IRFA, as enacted, did not reflect the narrow support of a particular 
group but was adopted unanimously in both the Senate and the 
House and ultimately was supported by the Clinton administration. 
 
 28. See Christy Cutbill McCormick, Exporting the First Amendment: America’s Response 
to Religious Persecution Abroad, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 283, 330 (1998). For brief histories 
of the legislative and lobbying process that culminated in IRFA, see, for example, id. at 283-
89, and Kristin N. Wuerffel, Discrimination Among Rights?: A Nation’s Legislating a Hierar-
chy of Human Rights in the Context of International Human Rights Customary Law, 33 VAL. 
U.L. REV. 369, 412 n.12 (1998). See also Goldberg supra note 9, at 48. 
 29. HARFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 58 (John Hanford, legislative aid to Sena-
tor Lugar). 
 30. See 22 U.S.C. § 640(a)(7) (1998). 
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Regardless of its parentage and textual wording, IRFA can be 
criticized in practice for focusing disproportionately on religious is-
sues of particular concern to Americans, including difficulties en-
countered abroad by American missionaries and by religions that are 
particularly identified with the United States origination, such as the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons. For example, it is probably 
fair to say that the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on 
Human Rights and the U.S. Department of State Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom demonstrate a relatively greater 
awareness of difficulties encountered by Protestant Evangelical, 
Catholic, and Jewish communities abroad than, for example, the 
problems encountered by Muslims and Orthodox Christians.31 There 
is, in a word, under-reporting by the Department of State of dis-
crimination suffered by certain groups that are relatively under-
represented in the United States. 
This is not to say, however, that such violations go totally unre-
ported or that there is an intentional policy of omission.32 The expla-
nation is in some measure due to the simple fact that overworked 
and understaffed U.S. embassies are more likely to report on prob-
lems that are brought to their attention than they are on problems 
that would need to be researched. American missionaries abroad are 
becoming increasingly well aware that they can report difficulties 
they encounter, whether in obtaining visas or distributing literature, 
to appropriate U.S. embassies or the Department of State in Wash-
ington and that they are increasingly likely to receive helpful re-
sponses. In contrast, it is probably not obvious to Muslims living in 
Norway or Old Believers living in Russia that they should report on 
incidents of discrimination to U.S. embassies in Oslo and Moscow 
respectively.33 With additional time and resources, the quality and 
 
 31. The author has also heard the criticism that IRFA is designed to protect only rights 
of religion rather than rights of religion or belief—and thus that the United States is not actu-
ally promoting the international standard but only the religious component of the international 
standard. There is, in fact, only modest reporting by the Department of State on belief-related 
rights of atheists and agnostics. 
 32. For example, the controversies surrounding the right of religious Muslim women to 
wear headscarves are included in the 1999 RELIGION REPORT, supra note 13, for Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
 33. The author had a conversation with a Norwegian Muslim on exactly this point. She 
commented that the religious freedom report on Norway was overly generous to the govern-
ment and under-reported discrimination suffered by Muslims. She acknowledged that it had 
not occurred to her or to other Muslims to convey such information to the U.S. embassy in 
Oslo. 
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thoroughness of the reporting should improve. While the Depart-
ment of State continues in its efforts to enhance the quality and con-
sistency of its reporting, significant logistical and practical obstacles 
remain. We can hope that, over time, people will bring to the atten-
tion of U.S. officials examples of violations of religious freedom and 
that the quality of reporting will improve. 
While working at the Department of State and while participat-
ing in discussions with foreign governments, the author observed no 
obvious effort by the United States to favor Christians nor to seek 
remedies for Christian groups at the expense of other faiths. Indeed, 
the United States voiced concerns to the Greek government, for ex-
ample, about the rights of Muslims in Greece just as it voiced con-
cerns to the Turkish government about the rights of Greek Ortho-
dox believers in Turkey. In relations with governments in western 
Europe, the United States has expressed concern about several new 
religious groups, some of whom were Protestant, but most of whom 
were not. Moreover, U.S. embassy officials are increasingly making 
efforts to reach out to a range of religious groups that suffer dis-
crimination. The Office of International Religious Freedom has 
taken concerted efforts to reach out to Muslim communities that 
traditionally have had relatively less access to the foreign policy ma-
chinery than have Christian and Jewish groups. 
IRFA, as correctly suggested by Jemera Rone, also is seen as 
promoting the work of American missionaries abroad. For some crit-
ics, the providing of political support to missionaries who encounter 
difficulties abroad can be seen to be a part of the larger problem of 
American insensitivity and indifference to foreign histories, tradi-
tions, religions, and cultures. To such observers, the United States 
may be characterized as constantly selling to others its superficially 
appealing but ultimately shallow exports, whether they be McDon-
ald’s, Coca-Cola, Disneyland, sneakers, blue jeans, rock music, or 
motion pictures. IRFA thus may be seen as an effort to export and 
defend yet another product: American religions and missionaries.34 
 
 34. Foreign observers sometimes caricature the American religious culture as embodying 
a “consumer market” ethos. The critics will see American missionaries abroad as salesman ex-
porting and attempting to fulfill their quotas of converts and thereby gain a “market share” 
over their competitors. Such missionaries are said to use sophisticated “sales techniques” to 
gain new customers at the expense of religions that have failed to modernize and have lost 
touch with their own “consumer base” through poor advertising. Countries with more tradi-
tional approaches to regulation of religion may well find such analogies to be persuasive and to 
be consistent with other fears about the growing influence of American popular culture. 
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But the correct issue is not whether religious communities in the 
United States have an overabundance of missionary zeal, but 
whether governments should be permitted to restrict freedom of ex-
pression on matters of religion or restrict the right of people to re-
ceive information about religion. Though new forms of religion may 
appear to undermine traditional beliefs, international covenants do 
not permit limitations on expression on the grounds that such ex-
pression is anathema to history, tradition, and culture. International 
standards, moreover, suggest that missionaries do have a right to 
freedom of expression,35 that individuals have the freedom to change 
their religious beliefs,36 and that individuals have the right to receive 
information.37 
C. Criticism 3: IRFA Improperly Establishes a Hierarchy of Human 
Rights and Places Religion at the Zenith 
There has been some suggestion that IRFA constitutes an effort 
to establish a hierarchy of rights and to place religious freedom at its 
zenith.38 It should not be surprising if many IRFA supporters might 
believe that religious freedom is the most important human right any 
more than it would be surprising to learn that other human rights 
advocates believe that freedom from torture or freedom of expres-
sion to be the most important human rights. It is only natural that 
people involved in human rights campaigns are attracted to work on 
 
  The country that has responded with possibly the strongest reaction against foreign 
missionaries has been Russia. For a number of articles describing this reaction, see 
PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY IN RUSSIA: THE NEW WAR FOR SOULS (John Witte Jr. & 
Michael Bourdeaux eds., 1999). 
 35. See, e.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (¶ 31) (1993) 
(“According to Article 9 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], freedom to mani-
fest one’s religion is not only exercisable in community with others, ‘in public’ and within the 
circle of those whose faith one shares, but can also be asserted ‘alone’ and ‘in private’; further-
more, it includes in principle the right to try to convince one’s neighbour, for example through 
‘teaching’, failing which, moreover, ‘freedom to change [one’s] religion or belief’, enshrined in 
Article 9, would be likely to remain a dead letter.”). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See, e.g., Leander Case, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (¶ 74) (1987) (“[T]he 
right to freedom to receive information basically prohibits a Government from restricting a 
person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him.”). 
 38. For a discussion of this issue, see Wuerffel, supra note 28. Mickey Spiegel of Human 
Rights Watch similarly raised the concern about creating a hierarchy of rights, particularly 
when rights in reality should be understood to be interconnected. See HARTFORD 
CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 18-19. See also the September 9, 1997, testimony of John 
Shattuck, supra note 9. 
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the particular issues of greatest personal significance to them. It is 
understandable that some people believe that the right of conscience 
is the most sensitive right and needs the most protection. 
Regardless of the motivations of the law’s supporters, IRFA and 
the Department of State do not assert that religion is the most im-
portant human right, nor do they emphasize the importance of reli-
gious freedom to the exclusion of other rights. The fact that Con-
gress adopted legislation does not signify, in and of itself, that 
religion should be placed at the top of a hierarchy. The legislation 
need signify only that religious freedom is a right that has been rela-
tively neglected by governments and international organizations and 
that it needs greater protection. IRFA does not create a hierarchy; 
rather, it highlights an important, vulnerable, and heretofore ne-
glected right. 
D. Criticism 4: IRFA is Designed to Punish Countries by the 
Unilateral Imposition of Sanctions by the United States 
The original Wolf-Specter bill contained provisions that imposed 
economic sanctions automatically on countries that were found to 
engage in religious persecution.39 These provisions generated the 
greatest opposition from the Clinton Administration and the busi-
ness community.40 However, unlike the Wolf-Specter bill, IRFA does 
not impose automatic sanctions. Instead, it provides the President 
with a menu of fifteen enumerated “presidential actions,” any one of 
which should be imposed against countries that are identified by the 
 
 39. See H.R. 1685, 105th Cong. (1997). In brief, the Wolf-Specter bill created an Of-
fice of Religious Persecution Monitoring within the Executive Office of the President. See H.R. 
1685, § 5. The Director of the Office of Persecution Monitoring (“Director”), who was to be 
appointed by the President, see id. § 5(b), was charged with the responsibility of, inter alia, 
“determin[ing] whether a particular country is engaged in . . . religious persecution, and iden-
tify[ing] the responsible entities within such countries.” Id. § 5(e)(4). Once a country had 
been so designated, Wolf-Specter provided that the appropriate agencies within the U.S. gov-
ernment “shall—(i) prohibit all exports to the responsible entities . . . and (ii) prohibit the ex-
port to such country . . . products, goods, and services: that had been identified by the Direc-
tor.” Id. § 7(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The President was nevertheless authorized, under 
certain circumstances, to waive the sanctions for periods of not more than 12 months. See id. § 
8(a). 
 40. For the Clinton Administration’s position on sanctions generally, see Stuart E. 
Eizenstat’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 1, 1999. See Stuart 
E. Eizenstat et al., U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing on the International Reli-
gious Freedom Act (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/ 
1998/981009_eizen_etal_relig.html>. 
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Department of State as violators of religious freedom.41 They include 
issuing a private demarche, withdrawal of foreign aid, and blocking 
commercial contracts.42 The President also is authorized to take an 
 
 41. 22 U.S.C. § 6445. 
 42. The fifteen enumerated actions are: 
(1) A private demarche. 
(2) An official public demarche. 
(3) A public condemnation. 
(4) A public condemnation within one or more multilateral fora. 
(5) The delay or cancellation of one or more scientific exchanges. 
(6) The delay or cancellation of one or more cultural exchanges. 
(7) The denial of one or more working, official, or state visits. 
(8) The delay or cancellation of one or more working, official, or state visits. 
(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assis-
tance in accordance with section 2151n of this title. 
(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the 
issuance of any (or a specified number of) guarantees, insurance, extensions of 
credit, or participations in the extension of credit with respect to the specific gov-
ernment, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President 
to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or 6442 of this title. 
(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in 
accordance with section 2304 of this title. 
(12) Consistent with section 262d of this title, directing the United States executive 
directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against loans pri-
marily benefiting the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official 
found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 
6441 or 6442 or this title. 
(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any 
(or a specified number of) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific au-
thority (or a specific number of authorities), to export any goods or technology to 
the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or deter-
mined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or 6442 
of this title, under – 
(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 [50 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.]; 
(B) the Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.]; 
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.]; or 
(D) any other statue that requires the prior review and approval of the United 
States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or ser-
vices. 
(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or 
providing credits totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the 
specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined 
by the President to be responsible for violations under section 6441 or 6442 of this 
title. 
(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into 
any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign gov-
ernment, entities, or officials found or determined by the President to be responsible 
for violations under section 6441 or 6442 of this title. 
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appropriate “commensurate” action, even if it is not included in the 
list of fifteen.43 Unlike the Wolf-Specter bill, IRFA does not use the 
term “sanction” to describe the enumerated presidential actions. 
Both publicly and privately, the first Ambassador-at-Large advised 
that IRFA is not designed to punish violators but to promote reli-
gious freedom. In his September 9, 1999 press conference announc-
ing the release of the first religion report, Ambassador Seiple stated: 
This International Religious Freedom Act is designed to promote 
religious freedom. [W]e desperately want to work with those coun-
tries in the promotion around the common agenda in ways that will 
enhance religious freedom for their people. 
 . . . 
 . . . We do not look at this bill as a punitive bill. We do not look 
at this bill as a way to punish people. We do not look at this bill as 
a moral high ground for one country against another. We are in the 
business of promoting international religious freedom; we will work 
with anyone who will work with us to enhance that right.44 
In the minds of some foreign officials, however, IRFA retains the 
vestigial legacy of the automatic sanctions provision of the Wolf-
Specter bill.45 
Although the law does not provide for “sanctions” per se, it does 
require that the President undertake one of the fifteen specified ac-
tions against “violators” of religious freedom as well as one of six  
 
 
 
22 U.S.C. § 6445(a) (citations omitted). 
 43. According to 22 U.S.C. § 6445(b), 
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the President may substitute 
any other action authorized by law for any action described in paragraphs (1) 
through (15) of subsection (a) of this section if such action is commensurated in ef-
fort to the action substituted and if the action would further the policy of the 
United States set forth in section 6401(b) of this title. The President shall seek to 
take all appropriate and feasible actions authorized by law to obtain the cessation of 
the violations. If commensurate action is taken, the President shall report such ac-
tion, together with an explanation for taking such action, to the appropriate con-
gressional committees. 
 44. Robert Seiple & Harold Hongju Koh, Briefing, Release of the 1999 Annual Report 
on International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State Web Site (visited Aug. 22, 
2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990909_seiple_koh_irf.html>. 
 45. In the author’s experience, officials of foreign governments who are aware of IRFA 
typically assume that it operates in the manner initially proposed by the Wolf-Specter bill. 
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actions against those countries designated as “particularly severe vio-
lators.”46 
While it is correct to say that a “presidential action” must be 
taken against each state identified as a “violator,” a private de-
marche—a confidential communication between governments—
satisfies this requirement.47 This falls well short of the automatic 
sanctions that bore the brunt of criticism surrounding the Wolf-
Specter legislation. 
E. Criticism 5: The United States Acts Hypocritically by Arguing in 
Favor of Religious Freedom Abroad While it Commits Human Rights 
Abuses at Home 
States sometimes respond to U.S. government criticism of their 
human rights practices by replying that the United States should not 
criticize other states until it perfects its own human rights record. 
For example, after the United States criticized French government 
policies on religious minorities at a human rights implementation 
meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(“OSCE”), the French delegate countered that the United States, 
which bears responsibility for the incident of the Branch Davidian 
 
 46. See supra note 42 for a listing of the fifteen possible actions. For “particularly severe 
violators,” which are also described in the law as “countries of particular concern,” the Presi-
dent must take one of the actions designated as 9 through 15 or some commensurate action. 
22 U.S.C. § 6442(c). 
  At his congressional testimony on October 6, 1999, Ambassador Seiple identified 
the five countries designated by the President as “countries of particular concern” for 1999: 
Burma (Myanmar), China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. Ambassador Seiple also identified “the Tali-
ban in Afghanistan, which we do not recognize as a government, and Serbia, which is not a 
country, as particularly severe violators of religious freedom.” Although the Secretary of State’s 
official designation of these countries was subsequently forwarded to Congress, neither Con-
gress nor the President has released a copy of that message. Human Rights, and Labor Testi-
mony Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/ 
1999/991006_seiple_koh_irf.html> (testimony by Ambassador Robert A. Seiple). 
 47. According to the Department of State: 
The promotion of religious freedom involves far more than public airing of viola-
tions. The most productive work often is done behind the scenes, for a very simple 
reason: no government or nation is likely to respond with alacrity when publicly re-
buked. It is, of course, sometimes necessary for the United States, and the interna-
tional community, to denounce openly particularly abhorrent behavior by another 
nation. 
1999 RELIGION REPORT, supra note 13, at 9. 
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disaster at Waco, should not criticize other countries.48 The Chinese 
government similarly responds to the U.S. Department of State re-
ports issued on its human rights practices. In response to the U.S. 
criticisms of China’s crackdown on the Falun Gong, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry announced that “China is indignant over the U.S. 
government’s double standard on the Falun Gong Sect. The U.S. 
appears to be totally oblivious to the pernicious influence of the sect 
in China and continues to meddle in China’s internal affairs.”49 
When the United States released the 1999 Country Reports on Hu-
man Rights Practices, the China Society for Human Rights Studies 
responded that the “U.S. Government needs to keep an eye on its 
own human rights problems, mind its own business and stop inter-
fering in the internal affairs of other countries.”50 
If the United States were to assert that it commits no human 
rights abuses and that other countries should follow its example, the 
criticisms offered by the French government and Chinese govern-
ment might well be appropriate. But the Department of State does 
not lay claim to American perfectionism nor does it hold out the 
United States as a role model. When asked whether the United 
States complies with international standards for freedom of religion, 
Ambassador Seiple responded: 
The United States has its imperfections and we do not set ourselves 
up as a moral watchdog for the rest of the world. We have prob-
lems that we are working on. I think if you look at the history of 
the 223 years of this republic, compare that with any other nation-
state in the world, we can be very proud of what has happened. 
That doesn’t make us perfect and we don’t suggest that that is the 
case.51 
The United States should not be precluded from calling other 
countries to account simply because it has its own failings. Similarly, 
 
 48.  The November 1998 speech by the French representative was not published or tran-
scribed. 
 49.  Zhang Qiyue, China Against U.S. Double Standard on Falun Gong Cult, CHINA 
DAILY, Dec. 7, 1999 (visited Aug. 23, 2000) <http://www.chinadaily.net/falun/c081.htm>. 
 50.  U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999 (visited Aug. 23, 2000) <http://www. human-
rights-china.org/en/eindex.html>. The article was prepared by The China Society for Human 
Rights Studies, which the official Chinese government web site describes as “a national aca-
demic society [that is] a nongovernmental organization in special consultative status with the 
United National Economic and Social Council (UNESCO).” 
 51.  Seiple & Koh, supra note 44. 
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France and China should not be precluded from criticizing the 
United States because of their internal problems. The international 
human rights regime assumes mutual accountability; it does not re-
quire that the accuser be above reproach.52 
F. Criticism 6: The United States Acts Inconsistently on Human Rights 
Issues by Advocating International Standards While Acting 
Unilaterally 
[I]f these are international standards[,] why then are we not part of 
an international effort to make changes within some of the coun-
tries that we are concerned about? 
 —Ms. Mickey Spiegel at the Hartford Conference53 
 
[The U.S. should join] other countries in efforts to protect and 
promote all human rights, instead of focusing so exclusively on this 
particular right [of religious freedom] while refusing to ratify other 
international human rights treaties . . . . It is curious that the U.S. 
is so protective of its own sovereignty that it refuses to ratify an al-
most universally ratified treaty like the Rights of the Child Conven-
tion, and yet it expects other countries to share its own particular 
concern with freedom of religion. 
[The] U.S. has consistently refused to be part of the process of de-
veloping and implementing international rights, whether on free-
dom of religion or any other human right, and yet here comes this 
“Lone Ranger” effort on this particular freedom. 
 —Professor Abdullahi An-Na’im at the Hartford Conference54 
 
It is true that the United States does not always act or wish to act 
as a full participant in supporting the international human rights re-
 
 52.  By analogy, there are medical doctors who smoke cigarettes even though they know 
of the serious risks attached to smoking. If one of these doctors urges a patient not to smoke, 
what is the wisest response of a patient who genuinely wishes to improve her health? To criti-
cize the doctor for being a hypocrite? To ignore the doctor’s advice? While accusing the doctor 
of hypocrisy may comfort the accuser, it is not a useful response if the patient genuinely wants 
to improve her health or the doctor’s. Rather than denounce the hypocrisy of the accuser, the 
goal should be to undertake a conscientious effort to determine what can be done to improve 
the quality of life. 
 53.  HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 21 (Spiegel). 
 54.  HARTFORD CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 25-26 (An-Na’im). 
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gime. There are a number of telling examples where the United 
States has removed itself from full participation with the international 
community. For example, the United States has been in serious ar-
rears in its payments to the United Nations, a solemn obligation of 
U.N. membership.55 It conspicuously asserts its own sovereignty in 
order to shelter it from international obligations that other states are 
willing to assume. The United States also frequently urges that there 
be significant changes during the process of drafting international 
human rights conventions, only to refuse to sign or to ratify the con-
vention once it has been adopted by the remainder of the interna-
tional community.56 When it does ratify a human rights convention, 
the United States often does so only after interposing a number of 
“reservations, understandings, and declarations.”57 Finally, although 
the United States files its annual country reports on the human 
rights practices of other states, it has been delinquent in filing reports 
on its own human rights practices, as required under such conven-
tions as the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination.58 For foreign observers, it can be 
troubling when the United States avoids full participation in the in-
ternational human rights process, but then insists that other coun-
tries must adhere to international freedom of religion standards as 
they are interpreted by the United States.59 
The U.S. Congress could enhance significantly the Department 
of State’s ability to promote international standards by helping to 
make the United States a full participant in the international system. 
Measures include ensuring that debts are paid to international or-
 
 55.  See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2. 
 56.  Perhaps the most recent example is the United States’ refusal to sign the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (as corrected by 
the procès-verbaux of Nov. 10, 1998, and July 12, 1999). 
 57.  One of many such examples is the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. For a typical criticism of this practice, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 
1999, at 386 (1999). 
 58.  See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. While it is appropriate to criticize 
the United States in this regard, it also should be noted that many other states similarly are 
delinquent and that the valid criticism also applies to others. 
 59.  This is another version of the hypocrisy argument that was made in Criticism 5 
above. Here, the emphasis is not on internal U.S. human rights behavior but on American par-
ticipation in the international community. As with the preceding criticism, there is some merit 
to the argument, except when it is overstated or used to excuse others’ failures to comply with 
human rights norms. 
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ganizations of which the United States is a member; ratifying inter-
national conventions; and ratifying conventions without attaching 
reservations, understandings, and declarations that undermine the 
merits of the conventions. 
It is, nevertheless, inaccurate to suggest that the United States 
always acts alone on issues related to religious freedom. In the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission, for example, Ireland 
traditionally takes the lead for resolutions on religious freedom, and 
the United States is a continuing supporter of Ireland’s efforts.60 The 
United States was one of the original supporters of the resolution 
that created the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief and has supported the re-
newal of his mandate.61 In the OSCE, the United States has been a 
constant supporter of efforts to advance religious freedom. This 
strong support was manifest, for example, at the 1996 Seminar in 
Warsaw on Freedom of Religion and the creation of the Advisory 
Panel of Experts on Religion. The U.S. strongly supported Norway’s 
leadership in the first OSCE “Supplementary Meeting on Freedom 
of Religion,” which met in Vienna early in March of 1999. The 
United States joined with a number of European states in opposing 
the adoption of Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and 
Belief. It has worked regularly with other countries to free their na-
tionals who have been arrested for practicing religion in third coun-
tries. 
Critics of IRFA typically are unaware of these efforts by the 
United States to involve itself multilaterally in issues related to free-
dom of religion and belief. From the author’s experience, the critics 
who accuse the United States for acting as a “Lone Ranger” are not 
fully aware of the many multilateral efforts that the United States has 
undertaken. At the same time, the United States can and should un-
dertake more multilateral efforts to enlist the support of those gov-
ernments that are relatively sympathetic to religious freedom. 
The United States could strengthen its moral authority and in-
fluence in promoting freedom of religion if it were seen as a more 
 
 60.  See, e.g., Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intol-
erance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/33 (2000); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/39 (1999). 
 61.  See, e.g., David Weissbrodt, The Three “Theme” Special Rapporteurs of the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 685, 695-97 (1986). 
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consistent and engaged actor in the international community and if 
it sought to promote all recognized freedoms. But the critics of 
IRFA and the United States would do well both to recognize the 
multilateral efforts that the United States has made and, much more 
importantly, to urge other governments to engage more fully in the 
goal of promoting freedom of religion and belief. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As long as foreign observers believe that the United States is 
promoting a peculiarly American notion of religious freedom, the ef-
fectiveness of the United States’ efforts will be reduced. Religious 
freedom will best be advanced only when international standards are 
understood to be genuinely international and when the United 
States is seen as participating in a genuinely international effort. 
IRFA’s critics, however, frequently caricature the law and the ef-
forts of the United States by loosely employing clichés such as “Lone 
Ranger,” “imperialism,” and “market-oriented religion.” Such rhe-
torical criticisms are made without fully understanding how Ameri-
can diplomats actually engage other governments in discussions re-
garding discrimination on the basis of religion. Admittedly, the 
United States must be very careful about how it approaches the sen-
sitive issue of freedom of religion. But its critics also should be 
equally careful about how they characterize the United States’ ef-
forts. There is an important need, for all who are concerned by the 
issue of the promotion of religious freedom, to engage in a serious 
and nonpolemical discussion of the issues. 
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